Performance Audit on the Scheme for Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid and) Electric Vehicles in India, Ministry of Heavy Industries

निष्कर्ष

1. द्वितीय चरण में शहरों के लिए स्वीकृत 2,877 चार्जिंग स्टेशनों में से केवल चार क्रियान्वयन एजेंसियों ने 148 चालू किए; राजमार्गों एवं एक्सप्रेसवे के लिए स्वीकृत सभी 1,576 स्टेशन नगण्य प्रगति के कारण रद्द कर दिए गए; और तीन तेल विपणन कंपनियों को दिए 8,412 स्टेशनों में से एक भी 31 मार्च 2024 की समय-सीमा तक चालू नहीं हुआ।

   “There was negligible progress in setting up of charging infrastructure in Phase II. Out of a total of 2,877 charging stations (20 implementing agencies) approved by PISC for 'Cities', only four implementing agencies commissioned a total of 148 charging stations. Besides, no funds were released under 'Highways and Expressways' Project as there was negligible progress in installation/ commissioning of charging stations under this project. The Ministry cancelled all 1,576 charging stations approved under this project. Further, none of 8,412 charging stations awarded to three oil marketing companies was commissioned as on the stipulated completion date of 31 March 2024.”Executive Summary

2. 104 चार्जिंग स्टेशनों के संयुक्त निरीक्षण में चार्जर बिना बिजली, चार्जर स्थल से हटाए गए, चार्जर लगाए ही नहीं गए, कर्मचारी जिन्हें उपयोग की जानकारी नहीं, प्रबंधन प्रणाली बंद, दोपहिया की जगह कार के चार्जर, और ईवी के लिए निर्धारित जगह पर अन्य वाहन मिले।

   “Audit team and officials of implementing agencies jointly inspected (February to July 2023) 104 charging stations/chargers including 25 solar plants installed at such charging stations. Various issues were seen during the joint physical inspection such as chargers not being powered, chargers removed from installation site, chargers not found installed at sites, non-awareness of the staff about charging procedure, non-functional Charging Management System, vandalism to occupy parking space designated for EV charging, damaged chargers, car chargers installed at parking designated for two-wheelers, etc.”Executive Summary

3. पाँच निर्माताओं ने चरणबद्ध निर्माण कार्यक्रम की स्थानीयकरण शर्तों का उल्लंघन किया और फिर भी उन्हें ₹467.96 करोड़ माँग प्रोत्साहन दिया गया; दो ने बाद में ब्याज सहित ₹190.90 करोड़ लौटाए और शेष तीन से वसूली प्रक्रिया में थी।

   “Five OEMs violated the localisation requirements stipulated under the Phased Manufacturing Programme despite which demand incentive of ₹467.96 crore was disbursed to them. The violation was discovered at a later stage, after the testing agencies carried out detailed examination of records, physical plant inspection, and strip-down analysis of vehicles, on the specific directions of the Ministry itself. Two out of the five OEMs refunded the entire demand incentive availed by them including interest, amounting to ₹190.90 crore to the Ministry.”Executive Summary

4. तीन निर्माताओं ने अपने इलेक्ट्रिक दोपहिया वाहनों के कारख़ाना-मूल्य से ऑनबोर्ड चार्जर बाहर रखा और उसे सहायक उपकरण के रूप में बेचा, जिससे वाहन ₹1.5 लाख की पात्रता सीमा के नीचे रहे; उन्होंने ग्राहकों को ₹296.52 करोड़ लौटाए, और फ़रवरी 2025 तक ₹29.45 करोड़ लौटाना बाक़ी था।

   “Three OEMs did not include the cost of the onboard charger in the ex-factory price of e-2-wheelers models and instead sold the charger as an accessory so that the ex-factory price of the vehicle did not exceed the notified threshold of ₹1.5 lakh, and the vehicle models became eligible for demand incentive. The OEMs refunded ₹296.52 crore to the customers as a cost of charger and a sum of ₹29.45 crore was yet to be refunded till February 2025.”Executive Summary

5. प्रोत्साहन पोर्टल बिना परियोजना प्रतिवेदन या सेवा स्तर समझौते के बनाया गया, इसलिए सुपुर्दगी, समय-सीमाएँ, परीक्षण प्रोटोकॉल और डेटा अखंडता की अपेक्षाएँ संविदा में कभी परिभाषित ही नहीं हुईं, और वह न दावों की पूरी प्रक्रिया कर सकता था न उनका सत्यापन।

   “There were discrepancies in the Demand Incentive Delivery Mechanism (DIDM) portal (Phase I & II) such as non-preparation of Detailed Project Report and non-signing of Service Level Agreement for portal development. As such, important aspects such as key deliverables, timelines, testing protocols, data/system integrity requirements, defects management and change management procedures were not contractually defined. Also, the Portal did not have functionalities for end-to-end online processing of claims by the Ministry, and there was lack of validation controls in the Portal.”Executive Summary

6. मंत्रालय द्वारा दी गई फ़ाइलों में वाहनवार ब्योरा न होने के कारण लेखापरीक्षा यह परख ही नहीं सकी कि प्रथम चरण में दर्ज माँग प्रोत्साहन स्वीकार्य था या नहीं।

   “As the physical/e-files relating to processing of demand incentive claims provided by the Ministry did not contain any vehicle-wise details, Audit was unable to analyse or derive assurance as to the admissibility of the demand incentive reported in these files.”Executive Summary

7. परीक्षण एजेंसियों के लिए पात्रता आकलन रिपोर्ट जारी करने की कोई समय-सीमा तय ही नहीं थी, और कुछ ने 497 दिन तक लिए।

   “No timelines were notified by the Ministry for testing and issuance of Eligibility Assessment Reports (EARs) by the testing agencies under the FAME India Scheme. In the absence of this, there was no control/monitoring over the time taken by testing agencies to complete the testing and certification process and considerable time (ranging up to 497 days) was taken in issuing EARs by the testing agencies.”Executive Summary

8. दिसंबर 2022 तक — योजना अधिसूचित होने के आठ वर्ष बाद भी — मोटर वाहन नियमों में इलेक्ट्रिक वाहनों के लिए पूर्ण-वाहन सुरक्षा उत्पादन-अनुरूपता परीक्षण नहीं था, और प्रथम चरण में वार्षिक पुनर्वैधीकरण नहीं था, इसलिए यह स्थापित ही नहीं हो सका कि निर्माता मूल रूप से स्वीकृत पुर्ज़े ही उपयोग कर रहे हैं।

   “There was no provision for electric vehicle models to undergo Conformity of Production (COP) tests for annual revalidation in Phase-I, rendering it impossible to ascertain that the OEMs were using the same components that were originally tested and approved at the time of initial eligibility assessment. Further there was no provision in CMVR, 1989 for whole-vehicle safety COP testing for electric/battery-operated vehicles till December 2022, i.e. more than eight years after notification of the FAME India scheme.”Executive Summary

9. दिसंबर 2025 तक द्वितीय चरण में 6,862 के संशोधित लक्ष्य के मुक़ाबले 5,195 इलेक्ट्रिक बसें तैनात हुई थीं, और उनके प्रदर्शन की निगरानी के लिए दिसंबर 2020 तक वादा किया गया केंद्रीय सर्वर अब तक बना ही नहीं था।

   “Under Phase-II, as of 31 December 2025, 5,195 e-buses had been deployed under the Scheme, out of the revised target of 6,862 buses… The central server required to be developed for monitoring performance of e-buses had not been developed by the Ministry despite an assurance given (November 2019) in the third meeting of the Project Implementation and Sanctioning Committee that the central server would be available by December 2020.”Executive Summary

10. एक चार्जिंग परियोजना पर ख़र्च ₹12.66 करोड़ निष्फल हो गया — 122 किलोवाट चार्जर और ट्रांसफ़ॉर्मर कभी चालू नहीं हुए, सौर संयंत्र कभी शुरू नहीं हुए, केबल स्थापना एजेंसी के पास पड़ी बताई गई — और मंत्रालय की निधि से आईआईटी मद्रास द्वारा 2017 में बनाई गई केंद्रीय प्रबंधन प्रणाली कभी अपनाई ही नहीं गई।

    “In case of one project awarded to REIL in January 2019, expenditure of ₹12.66 crore was rendered infructuous as 122 KW chargers and power transformers were not powered; solar plants were not commissioned and unused cable was reportedly lying with the installation agency… Audit observed that IIT Madras had already developed a CMS in June 2017 out of funds released by the Ministry under the Technology Development (R&D) component, but the same was not adopted/operationalised by the Ministry.”Executive Summary

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