Prioritize Safety and invest in long required overhaul of stressed infrastructure, strict norms and warning systems… Convert all unmanned crossings into manned crossings in a phased manner.

The 2014 manifesto's railway section makes a commitment that is unusually candid about the state of the asset: "Prioritize Safety and invest in long required overhaul of stressed infrastructure, strict norms and warning systems." Alongside it sits a specific, countable pledge — "Convert all unmanned crossings into manned crossings in a phased manner."

Both were acted on. Unmanned level crossings on the broad gauge network were eliminated, and in 2017-18 the government created the Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh, a dedicated fund for exactly the overhaul the manifesto described. The CAG's performance audit of derailments, tabled on 21 December 2022, examines what happened next — 2017-18 to 2020-21, the years the fund was running.

Its most direct finding is that the money moved away from the work. "The overall expenditure on Priority-I works from RRSK showed a declining trend from 81.55 per cent in 2017-18 to 73.76 per cent in 2019-20." The single largest such work is renewing worn track, and its allotment "declined from ₹9607.65 crore (2018-19) to ₹7417 crore in 2019-20" — and even that reduced amount was "not fully utilized". Set against that: "Out of 1127 derailments during 2017-21, 289 derailments (26 per cent) were linked to track renewals." A quarter of the derailments traced back to the work whose budget was being cut and underspent.

The inspection regime that is supposed to catch a deteriorating track before it fails was not running either. Shortfalls "ranging from 30-100 per cent in inspections by Track Recording Cars required to assess geometrical and structural conditions of railway tracks." And the machines that do the repairs stood idle for administrative reasons more than technical ones: blocks "not given by the Operating Department (32 per cent)" and "not planned by Divisions (30 per cent)".

The causes the audit found in 1,129 inquiry reports across 16 zonal railways are consistent with that. "Total 422 derailments were attributable to the 'Engineering Department'", the largest cause being maintenance of track (171 cases) followed by "deviation of track parameters beyond permissible limits" (156 cases). Another 275 came from the operating department, 84 per cent of those from "incorrect setting of points and other mistakes in shunting operations"; 182 from mechanical defects, largely wheel and coach or wagon problems; and 154 from loco pilots, mainly "Bad Driving/Over speeding".

The manifesto also promised strict norms. On the accountability side of those norms, the audit found the process slipping: inquiry reports were not submitted to the accepting authority on time "in 63 per cent cases", and acceptance itself was delayed in 49 per cent. A safety system learns from accidents through those reports; late reports mean late learning.

One finding stands out for being both simple and stark. Fire extinguishers, a basic norm, "had not been provided in 27,763 coaches (62 per cent) in violation of extant norms."

On the countable pledge, delivery was partial in this window: of 2,908 manned level crossings targeted for elimination during 2018-21, 2,059 — 70 per cent — were removed.

The fund was created and the crossings were dealt with, which is why this is not a flat failure. But the manifesto's word was prioritize, and priority shows up in budgets and inspections. On the audited record, the safety fund's highest-priority share fell, track renewal money was cut and left partly unspent, and the inspections that would have found the bad track were short by up to 100 per cent. Our verdict is lacks context.