Strict implementation of laws related to women, particularly those related to rape… Fund for relief and rehabilitation of rape victims lies unused at the Centre as the Government has not worked out the modalities of dispensation. BJP will clear this on priority… extend fast track courts to all layers of the judiciary.

The 2014 manifesto was written sixteen months after the December 2012 Delhi gang rape, and its women's section reflects that. Three of its commitments can be tested against the record: "Strict implementation of laws related to women, particularly those related to rape"; a specific complaint that the "Fund for relief and rehabilitation of rape victims lies unused at the Centre as the Government has not worked out the modalities of dispensation. BJP will clear this on priority"; and, in the governance section, a promise to "extend fast track courts to all layers of the judiciary."

The instrument that eventually did what the first and third of these describe is the Fast Track Special Courts scheme. The Department of Justice's answer to the Lok Sabha of 31 July 2026 dates it precisely: "A Centrally Sponsored Scheme to set up Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs), including exclusive POCSO (ePOCSO) courts, was launched in October, 2019, for the expeditious trial and disposal of pending cases related to rape and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012."

October 2019 is five months after the term this promise belongs to ended. Whatever the scheme has since achieved — and it has disposed of 3,96,940 cases — it was not done in the 2014-19 term, and this fact-check is about that term.

The scheme's existence also tells us something about the intervening five years. It was created because rape and POCSO cases had accumulated in the ordinary courts to a degree that required a dedicated tier; the government's own framing is "expeditious trial and disposal of pending cases". A backlog large enough to justify 1,023 new courts in 2019 is not the signature of strict, time-bound implementation between 2014 and 2019.

The middle commitment — the fund for rape victims, the Nirbhaya Fund created in 2013 — is the one the manifesto made most sharply, complaining that the money was sitting unused and promising to "clear this on priority". We do not hold a primary document that measures Nirbhaya Fund disbursement across 2014-19, and we will not restate figures we cannot source; what we can say is that the dedicated victim-facing court infrastructure it was meant to support was funded through a separate scheme launched in late 2019, with ₹1,259.51 crore released to states since.

The last commitment, extending fast track courts "to all layers of the judiciary", is the broadest and the least delivered. What exists is a targeted scheme for two categories of offence, initially for 1,023 courts, later reduced to 790, running on a temporary extension to September 2026 — not a general expansion of fast track courts through the judicial system.

Laws were amended in this period, including after the 2018 Kathua and Unnao cases, and that is a real part of the record. But the promise as written was about implementation, a fund and courts, and on all three the delivery came after the term or not at all. Our verdict is not supported.